Authors: Haoqi Shan, Boyi Zhang, Zihao Zhan, Dean Sullivan, Shuo Wang, Yier Jin

Published on: February 03, 2024

Impact Score: 8.12

Arxiv code: Arxiv:2402.02227

Summary

• What is new: First systematic demonstration of touchscreen vulnerabilities to IEMI attacks, including a novel method for inducing ghost touches and the first practical, robust, end-to-end IEMI attack vector.
• Why this is important: Lack of investigation into touchscreen resilience against Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) attacks, despite the ubiquity of touchscreen devices.
• What the research proposes: A detailed analysis of the mechanism behind IEMI attacks on touchscreens, including calculations for necessary electric field and signal frequency, and the development of a locator and feedback mechanism for practical attacks.
• Results: Successfully demonstrated the ability to inject various touch gestures on touchscreens from a distance, outperforming existing touchscreen attack methods by not requiring signal synchronization.

Technical Details

Technological frameworks used: Systematic analysis and demonstration of IEMI attacks on touchscreens, including attack mechanism analysis, locator and feedback mechanism design.

Models used: Mathematical models for calculating electric field and signal frequency required for ghost touch induction.

Data used: nan

Potential Impact

Touchscreen device manufacturers, cybersecurity firms, and industries reliant on secure touchscreen interactions could be impacted, necessitating enhanced security measures.

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